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ABSTRACT 
The existence of a natural resource curse has been a longstanding theme in the economic
literature and in policy discussions. We propose an alternative mechanism and study its policy
implications. The mechanism is based on the interaction between two building blocks: specialization
in non-tradables and financial market imperfections. We show that if a country has a sufficiently
large non-resource tradable sector, relative prices can be stable, even when the resource sector
generates significant volatility in the demand for non-tradables. However, when the non-resource
tradable sector disappears, the economy becomes much more volatile, because shocks to the demand
for non-tradables - possibly associated with shocks to resource income - will not be accommodated
by movements in the allocation of labor but instead by expenditure-switching. This requires much
higher relative price movements. The presence of bankruptcy costs makes interest rates dependent
on relative price volatility. These two effects interact causing the economy to specialize inefficiently
away from non-resource tradables: the less it produces of them, the greater the volatility of relative
prices, the higher the interest rate the sector faces, causing it to shrink even further until it
disappears. At that point, the economy will face an even higher interest rate and a lower level of
capital and output in the non-tradable sector. An increase in resource income that leads to
specialization causes a large decline in welfare: thus the idea of the curse. Specialization is
determined by the expected size and volatility in resource income. The paper justifies stabilization
and savings policies as well as policies to make financial markets more efficient. However, we also
find some support for more interventionist second-best trade and financial
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rigobon@mit.eduIt is often said that most people when reading about a theory wonder if it works in 
practice. Economists when they see things working in practice, wonder if they 
work in theory. The natural resource curse is a case in point. Countries highly 
dependent on oil or other natural resources performed very poorly since 1980. 
Figure 1 shows GDP per capita at purchasing power parity for highly resource-
intensive countries such as Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Venezuela and Zaire, and for 
less intensive countries such as Indonesia and Mexico. The pattern is clear, the 
more dependent performed remarkably poorly. The less oil-dependent did better. 
The concern that natural resource wealth may somehow be inmiserating is a 
recurring theme in both policy discussions and in empirical analysis. The 
empirical regularity seems to be in the data
1 but understanding its causes has been 
a much harder task
2. Theorists have been hard at work to find a rationale. Is it a 
consequence of the Dutch Disease? Is it caused by the volatility that characterizes 
resource-based commodity prices? Is it due to political economy forces unleashed 
by the presence of rents? And what are the policy implications of this problem?  
                                                 
1 For example, Sachs and Warner (1995) estimated that countries fully dependent on the export of 
primary products grew about 2.5 percent per year more slowly in the 1970-1989 period. Gavin and 
Hausmann (1998) and Higgins and Williamson (1999) find a strong relationship between resource 
intensity and inequality.   
2 For example, Manzano and Rigobon (2001) attribute the low growth to a debt overhang 
associated with over borrowing during the boom of the 1970s.  
  1Is there such a thing as having too much oil for the country’s own good? Should 
oil income be saved in net terms? Or is the question mainly that of dealing with 
the volatility in the flows? Are other policies called for? 
In this paper we will propose an alternative rationale for the resource curse and 
discuss some of its policy implications. The approach is based on the interaction 
between two building blocks: specialization of the domestic economy in the 
production of non-tradables and financial market imperfections. We show that as 
an oil economy becomes more specialized in the production of non-tradables, the 
real exchange rate becomes more volatile because shocks to the demand for non-
tradables –associated for example with the fiscal expenditure of shocks to 
resource income – will not be accommodated by movements in the allocation of 
capital and labor but instead by expenditure-switching. This requires much larger 
relative price movements. Financial frictions such as risk aversion or costly 
bankruptcy on corporate debt implies that the interest rate will be a function of the 
volatility in the economy. In fact, the volatility of profits in the non-resource 
tradable sector can be shown to be larger than in the non-tradable sector. As 
volatility increases, sector-specific interest rates rise causing a decline in the 
output that is larger for the non-resource tradable sector. A multiplier process is 
set in motion where an initial rise in interest rates causes the tradable sector to 
contract, further raising volatility and interest rates until the sector disappears. At 
  2that point, the economy will face an even higher interest rate and a lower level of 
capital and output in the non-tradable sector. An increase in resource income that 
leads to specialization causes a large decline in welfare: thus the idea of the curse. 
This form of specialization is inefficient and is characterized by high volatility 
and interest rates, weak real exchange rates, low wages and investment. 
Inefficient specialization is determined by the level and the volatility of resource 
income and by the international interest rate. The paper discusses the role of fiscal 
saving of oil revenues as well as stabilization of expenditures. In addition, 
independent policies that reduce country risk and that improve the functioning of 
financial markets are seen as being particularly important in this context. More 
interventionist policies to subsidize investment in the non-resource tradable sector 
may also have a role to play.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 summarizes and criticizes the 
previous literature on the resource curse. It also presents the logic of our approach 
in informal terms. Section 3 presents the formal model and analyzes its properties. 
Section 4 discusses the policy implications..  
I.  Previous approaches to the resource curse 
There have been several approaches in the literature to account for the resource 
curse. The first is associated with the notion of the Dutch Disease. The second has 
  3to do with the rent-seeking activities generated around the presence of the 
associated tax revenue. The third approach has to do with the damaging effects of 
volatility. In this section we will discuss each of these theories and their 
limitations.  
A.  The Dutch Disease Approach 
Increases in resource-based revenues, such as oil, generate a greater capacity to 
import tradables, but typically prompt a greater demand for all goods including 
non-tradables, which cannot be imported but must be produced locally. This 
requires the economy to move resources out of the non-resource tradable sector – 
call it manufacturing – in order to expand the production of non-tradables such as 
construction and services. An oil boom would lead to a contraction in 
manufacturing. A real appreciation is the mechanism that gets the job done 
(Corden, 1982, Corden and Neary, 1984). This is the Dutch disease.  
This logic is compelling, but by itself it does not imply any inefficiency or 
welfare loss. It only states that booms in resource income would be associated 
with contractions in manufacturing, not in overall growth. It cannot explain why a 
country would grow more slowly, just because it has oil.  
To get some mileage, one has to assume that non-resource tradables play a special 
role in the growth process. This is the tradition started by Matsuyama (1992) 
  4where he assumed that there are increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, but 
not in the resource sector. Hence, an abundance of the natural resource makes the 
economy specialize in the less dynamic sector
3. Hence, this may explain the 
curse.   
One problem with this explanation is that one should expect that over the long run 
oil-exporting countries would be doing poorly when oil is doing well and that 
they would be improving when oil becomes less dynamic. However, over the 60 
year period between the early 20s and the early 80s Venezuela was the country 
with the highest growth in per capita income out of the 40 countries for which 
Maddison (1992) has data. During the following 20 years, Venezuela is among 
the worst performers in the world, a period which coincides with the decline of its 
oil income (Hausmann, 2002). This is not just a coincidence. The same pattern 
can be observed if we look at the growth rate of a wider group of countries over a 
shorter period. As Table 1 shows, oil-exporting countries grew faster in the period 
of rising oil prices and volumes between 1960 and 1980 relative to other 
developing countries and collapsed when oil revenues declined after 1980. If the 
Dutch Disease story was right, the post-1980 story should have been one of 
greater growth. Hence, the story as such does not fit the facts.  
                                                 
3 Alternatively, it may want to diversify into resource-intensive industrialization, which has failed 
in many countries,  Auty (1990) 
  5Table 1. Average annual growth in per capita GDP at purchasing power prices 
            
Country group  1960-1998 1960-1980  1980-1998  Number of 
countries   
All developing  1.7 3  0.2  115   
- oil exporters  1.1 5.2  -2.1  15   
- others  1.8 2.7  0.5  100   
Source: World Penn Tables, own calculations      
Moreover, it is not obvious that learning by doing or technological development is 
slower in resource based industries relative to others. As the World Bank (2001) 
has shown in a recent report, several industrial countries such as Australia, 
Canada and Finland became rich by developing the technology and capital goods 
industries associated with their resource sectors. Moreover, whatever bad effects 
specializing in natural resources might generate they have to be compared with 
the benefits of owning large natural resources.  
For example, natural resource income may raise national savings and hence 
facilitate capital accumulation and growth. This is not a minor aspect as oil 
exporting economies have averaged twice the savings rate of non-oil exporters 
(Table 2). Moreover, they were able to save more and grow more in the period 
when oil was growing fast (1960-1980) relative to the more recent episode (1980-
1998).  
  6Table 2. Average domestic savings rate   
     
Country 
group 
1960-1998 1960-1980 1980-1998 Number  of 
countries 
All 
developing 
17.1 18.4 16.2 111 
- oil 
exporters 
33.2 37.9 30.1 15 
- others  14.6 15.3 14  96 
Source: World Penn Tables, own calculations   
B.  The Rent-Seeking Story 
An alternative story is that resource wealth such as oil somehow makes societies 
less entrepreneurial. There is so much wealth floating around the government that 
entrepreneurial persons find it much more profitable to engage in unproductive 
rent-seeking activities to appropriate that wealth rather than in creating more 
wealth. The presence of common-pool problems or uncertainty over property 
rights over the resource income may generate low growth by inefficiently 
focusing economies in fighting over existing resources.  
The common-pool problem – caused by situations where costs are shared between 
many agents but benefits are private (e.g. as in fiscal policy) – may lead to 
overspending on average and to a distorted allocation of spending over time. 
Overspending is associated with the idea that different constituencies do not 
  7internalize the full cost of their spending requests, as they only pay a small 
fraction of the additional tax burden. (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981, von 
Hagen and Harden, 1994). This problem is not specific to resource rich 
economies, but instead is present in all countries. However, in resource rich 
economies, where non-resource taxes are typically low and resource rents are 
large, it could be argued that this force could in theory be more powerful.  
In a dynamic setting this logic may lead to overborrowing and to a voracity effect 
(Hausmann, Powell and Rigobon , 1990, Velasco, 1995, Lane and Tornell , 1999). 
Assume that it is best to save a temporary boom until some future time when 
lower resource income is expected. An individual would choose to smooth 
consumption. However, when there is a common-pool problem each constituency 
will ask for a larger share of the pie in good times, fearing that if they don’t, other 
constituencies might take it away.  
This story again does not explain why oil economies did so well when incomes 
were rising and why they have under performed so strongly in the last two 
decades.  
In yet a different setting, others have argued (Karl 1997) that oil economies, by 
not developing the political compact that allows the State to tax its citizens are 
  8poorly equipped to deal with collapses in oil revenues without leading to 
macroeconomic crises.  
This logic may be present, but other factors may well overwhelm it. We already 
mentioned the fact that resource revenue may allow for higher savings. It may 
also allow the country to reduce taxation over more mobile factors and hence 
achieve a less distortionary overall taxation scheme, thus generating a more 
propitious economic environment for growth. Moreover, the political skills 
required to allocate rents among different groups may be useful in achieving the 
necessary reallocations when income declines.    
C.  The volatility story 
An alternative explanation to the curse puts the emphasis on volatility. Volatility 
has been shown to be bad for growth, for investment, for income distribution, for 
poverty and for educational attainment
4. Natural resource rents tend to be very 
volatile because the supply of natural resources exhibits low price-elasticities of 
supply.  For example, the standard deviation of oil price changes has been about 
30 to 35 percent per year. For a country where oil represents about 20 percent of 
                                                 
4 See IDB (1995), Gavin and Hausmann (1996), Ramey and Ramey (1995), Aizenman and Marion 
(1999), Caballero (2000). Flug et al (1996) and Duryea (1998) discuss the impact of volatility on 
educational attainment.  
  9GDP, a 1 standard deviation shock to the price of oil represents an income shock 
equivalent to 6 percent of GDP. This is huge relative to total GDP volatilities in 
industrial countries (about 2 percent) or even developing countries (between 3 and 
4 percent).  
But how does volatility in the terms of trade damage the economy? Assume that 
resource revenues are distributed to the population as a whole, say through 
government transfers. This means that the fact that the revenue is volatile makes it 
less valuable to risk-averse consumers. Let us take a relatively severe example. 
Assume that in a given economy oil is 30 percent of national income and that it 
has a standard deviation of about 30 percent per year. Assume that utility can be 
described with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with a 
relatively high coefficient of risk aversion of 3. This implies that consumers 
would be willing to sacrifice 4.05 percent of national income in order to make oil 
revenues perfectly certain. They would be willing to spend that much money in 
hedging their resource risk: certainly more than a simple nuisance, but nothing 
that could reasonably be called a curse, when compared with the revenue it 
generates. This could reasonably justify organizing a seminar to discuss how 
governments should manage this risk, but is not an adequate explanation for the 
massive collapse in growth exhibited in Figure 1.  
  10So the welfare losses associated with the consumption risk of the flow itself are 
not particularly large. To get bigger effects, the rest of the economy must 
somehow be disrupted by the volatility in oil. Interestingly, in a neo-classical 
setting, it is quite hard to make volatility matter. Imagine first a competitive 
economy in which capital is perfectly mobile internationally and labor is 
nationally fixed, but is perfectly mobile domestically across sectors. Assume that 
there are three sectors: a resource sector – which we will call oil; a tradable sector 
and a non-tradable sector. Oil is produced without either capital or labor: it is like 
manna from heaven. One can also think of it as aid. The two other sectors are 
produced with capital and labor and exhibit constant returns to scale. In this case, 
so long as all goods are produced domestically, the volatility of the oil sector will 
not affect the value of non-oil output or any non-oil relative price. The income of 
workers and the rate of return to capital in the non-oil economy will be unaffected 
by oil volatility!. Hence, the only problem will be the dislike for oil volatility 
itself and this we have already found not to be too serious. 
To understand this surprising result it is important to remember that there are five 
prices in this economy. First, the price of oil is determined abroad. Second, the 
rate of return to capital will be set by the world interest rate, given perfect capital 
mobility. Third, the price of tradables will be set internationally through the law 
of one price. Fourth, the internationally determined price of tradables and cost of 
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set the wage that the tradable sector can pay, which will determine, through the 
free movement of workers between sectors, the wage rate for the whole economy. 
Fifth, this will determine non-tradable prices since wages and the cost of capital 
are already set and profits must be zero. Shocks to the demand of non-tradables 
(induced possibly by oil shocks) will be adjusted through movements of labor 
between sectors and movements of capital in and out of the economy. The 
production possibility frontier will be completely flat as shown in Figure 2.  
We find this to be a very important benchmark not because it is an adequate 
description of the world, but because it provides a point of departure to think of 
the possible characteristics of the world – not included in the benchmark - that 
may explain why oil and its volatility may become really problematic.  
With full employment, and set wages and returns to capital, non-oil income will 
be stable. The only source of volatility will be the direct impact of oil revenues in 
household income. As we mentioned above, the welfare losses associated with 
this uncertainty are not huge: a nuisance more than a curse. To get to explain a 
curse the non-oil economy must be more seriously disturbed by oil volatility.  
What features of the world does our benchmark not take into account? First, 
capital takes time to build and once invested is usually irreversible. It cannot 
  12move instantaneously between sectors. This is certainly a problem. It means that 
the production function will be convex and that the volatility on government 
spending will cause shifts in relative prices. However, the consequences of this 
are not as serious as one might think. In a standard model, profits are a convex 
function of relative prices (Caballero 1991). This means that the greater the 
volatility in relative prices the larger will be the expected profits and average 
investment! Moreover, if we assume full employment, the welfare of workers 
may actually go up and not down with volatility, since they would be working on 
average with more capital. Hence, irreversibility of investment cannot be the basis 
for a serious curse.   
Second, consider the presence of price and wage rigidities that prevent the labor 
market from clearing. In this case, and assuming that capital is pre-determined 
and irreversible
5, volatility in oil income and government spending will translate 
into changes in unemployment and output in the non-tradable sector. Notice, 
however, that the tradable sector will remain unaffected: it will face constant 
prices, wages and stock of capital. Therefore employment and output will be 
constant. The non-tradable sector will have constant capital and wages but volatile 
output. It will also have more capital invested in the non-tradable sector than in 
                                                 
5 In makes sense to assume that if prices cannot be readjusted, that capital should be even harder to 
adjust.  
  13our benchmark, given the convexity of the profit function. Welfare losses caused 
by oil volatility are likely to be larger, because volatility is larger, but the 
expected average levels of output and consumption should not be much affected.  
D. Our  approach 
So where can the curse come from? We will argue that it will arise from an 
interaction between specialization and financial market imperfections. In the 
benchmark model we assumed that the economy was producing all goods. What 
happens if the non-oil economy stops producing tradables and becomes 
completely specialized in non-tradables? Central to the results of the benchmark 
model is the requirement that there be a positive level of production of tradables: 
the non-oil economy must not be fully specialized in non-tradables. This allows 
labor movements between sectors to absorb the shocks to non-tradable demand. If 
the economy were fully specialized in non-tradables, this result would disappear 
(Figure 3). Labor would now be fixed and fully employed in non-tradables. The 
only way to expand supply would be by increasing the amount of capital per 
worker in the sector. But capital is required to get the international rate of return. 
However, with labor fixed, the productivity of each additional unit of capital 
would be falling. To avoid returns to capital to fall, the price of non-tradables 
must go up. Hence, the supply of non-tradables will now be upward sloping. But 
the demand for non-tradables must be downward sloping. An increase in the price 
  14of non-tradables will cause expenditure-switching effects, as consumers will 
substitute away from the now more expensive non-tradables and into tradables. 
The relative price between these two goods, i.e. the real exchange rate will have 
to move in order to clear the market for non-tradables.  
So, in our benchmark model, a specialized economy with volatile resource 
revenue will see a volatile real exchange rate, while a diversified economy will 
have a constant real exchange rate. In this setting, irreversibility in capital will 
make relative prices even more volatile, as now the supply of non-tradables would 
be completely pre-determined, given that both labor and capital will be fixed. 
Only expenditure-switching forces will be at play. This will make the real 
exchange rate even more volatile.   
We will show below that this still is not enough to generate a real curse. In this 
paper we will propose a form of financial imperfection that will cause interest 
rates to be sensitive to the volatility in the real exchange rate. In particular, we 
will assume that only debt contracts are available and that bankruptcy is costly. 
This will make interest rates go up as the volatility of the real exchange rate 
increases. There is a vicious circle between greater volatility and interests rates on 
the one hand and lower investment in tradables on the other. The interest by the 
tradable sector increases until the sector disappears and the economy specializes 
inefficiently in non-tradables. The specialized economy will exhibit higher 
  15interest rates on nonn-tradables, lower capital and wages and a more depreciated 
exchange rate.  
II. Modeling the curse 
In this section we offer a formal model of the inefficient specialization. The 
ingredients of the model are the following: Assume there are three sectors in the 
economy, tradables, non-tradables and oil. Oil is assumed to consume no inputs 
and generates a stochastic stream of revenues denominated in tradables. We 
assume it is exogenous and denoted by  L g ~ . 
The tradable and non-tradable sector are comprised of a finite number of firms, 
each using one unit of capital and producing output according to  
α − =
1
N N l y  
in the non-tradable sector, and  
α − =
1
T T l y  
in the tradable sector. 
We assume that capital is owned by foreigners. This simplifies the analysis as it 
allows us to disregard the effect of changes in capital income. Furthermore, the 
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own some capital. We will assume that capital is irreversible and that it has to be 
decided one period before production and oil revenues are realized. 
We assume that oil belongs to the government, which consumes it entirely in non-
tradable goods. If the government decides to save its oil revenue, it will do so in 
foreign assets. We will assume that households derive no utility out of 
government consumption. This means that the volatile government consumption 
will not enter directly into the utility of risk-averse households who might want to 
smooth it. This eliminates the standard justification for stabilization. As discussed 
above, this cannot possibly be the source of the curse if there is one. We assume 
that there are no taxes.  
Finally, we assume that capital is fully depreciated in one period and that 
consumers cannot save. Thus, in this regard, the model is equivalent to a single 
period model. Consumers have a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function, with 
equal weights on tradable and non-tradable goods, and the share of non-tradables 
is β .  
  171. Production 
We assume that firms are small (price takers). We assume there are   firms in 
the non-tradable sector. Each firm requires an investment of one unit of capital to 
operate, and each production function is given by 
N N
α − =
1
N N l y  
Optimal labor decisions conditional on the capital invested in the non-tradable 
sector solves 
N N N wl l P −
− α 1 max  
where   and  are the price of non-tradable goods and wages in domestic 
currency respectively. The solution implies that labor demand is 
N P w
()
α
α
1
1  

 
 − =
w
P
l
N
N  
production is 
()
α
α
α
−
 

 
 − =
1
1
w
P
y
N
N  
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()
α
α
α
α
π
1
1
1  

 
 −
−
=
w
P
w
N
N  
The tradable sector is the same. There are   firms, were, again, each firm 
requires one unit of capital. We have assumed that the capital share is the same in 
both sectors. Hence, 
T N
()
α
α
1
1  

 
 − =
w
e
lT  
where e is the exchange rate. Production is 
()
α
α
α
−
 

 
 − =
1
1
w
e
yT  
and profits in the sector in domestic currency are 
()
α
α
α
α
π
1
1
1  

 
 −
−
=
w
e
w T  
  192. Government 
We assume that oil exports are in dollars. Hence, the total government 
consumption of non-tradable goods is  
L g
P
e
N
~  
In this simple setup we are assuming that the government does not face any 
financial frictions. In other words, the cost of financing is the same as the benefits 
of saving.  
3. Demand 
Households consume tradable and non-tradable goods, but not oil. There are no 
taxes. We assume that consumers’ utility can be represented by the standard 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Furthermore, to simplify the number of parameters 
under study, we assume that the weights are the same. 
 
Assume the consumers solve 
W C P eC st
C C
N N T
N T
≤ +
−
.
max
1 β β
 
  20where C , and W are the consumption in tradables, consumption of non 
tradables, and wealth of consumers, respectively. The FOC of the maximization 
problem implies the standard solution. Given our assumption that the capital is 
owned by foreigners, then comsumer’s wealth is given by total labor income. 
N T C ,
N
N P
w
L C β =  
4. Equilibrium 
Conditional on the amount of capital in the non-tradable sector let us compute the 
labor market equilibrium  
N N N
T T T
N T
l N L
l N L
L L L
=
=
= +
 
and the non-tradable goods market equilibrium in our benchmark model: 
N
N
N Y L g
P
e
C = + ~  
Substituting, the two equations solving for equilibrium are 
() () L
w
e
N
w
P
N T
N
N =  

 
 − +  

 
 −
α α
α α
/ 1 / 1
1 1  
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α
α
α β
−
 

 
 − = +
1
1 ~
w
P
N L g
P
e
P
w
L
N
N
N N
 
Define,  
N
N
P
e
Q
w
P
q
=
=
 
This implies that the two equations collapse to: 
() []
α α α
/ 1 / 1 1
− − = + q L Q N N T N  
() () g qQ
Q N N
N
T N
N ~ 1 1
/ 1 α β α
α − + − =
+
 
Note that the total number of firms must be grater than zero. Note also that it is 
impossible to find a set of parameters in which the number of non-tradable firms 
is zero. However, there exist a set of coefficients where the number of tradable 
firms indeed is zero. For those circumstances, the set of equations determining the 
equilibrium in the labor market and the non-tradable goods market are identical to 
the previous ones but with   equal to zero.  T N
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() []
α
α
α
β α
/ 1
~ 1 1
Q N N
N
g
L
N
T N
N
T
+
= Ψ
Ψ = 




 Ψ − − −
 
Hence, assume the number of firms in the non-tradable sector is fixed, this 
equation uniquely defines the solution for the number of tradable firms in 
equilibrium. Lets study the equilibrium in Figure 4. 
The downward slopping line corresponds to the LHS of the equation, and the 
increasing concave schedule is the RHS. Notice that all the uncertainty of oil 
expenditures appears on the RHS. Hence, we have depicted three schedules 
reflecting the (supposedly) maximum, median and minimum of the shocks. 
As can be seen, the two schedules determine (uniquely) the real exchange rate at 
which both equilibrium conditions are satisfied. Note that for each realization of 
the oil price there is a corresponding RER.  
In the figure, we have depicted an increase in the number of tradable firms. This 
makes the LHS line steeper. For a given level of uncertainty, this implies an 
increase in the expected value of Ψ , and a reduction in its variance. Since Ψ  is an 
inverse function of the RER, we conclude that a larger tradable sector requires a 
  23more depreciated exchange rate, but delivers a more stable RER for the same 
degree of oil-related uncertainty.  
This is an important characteristic of the model and it is useful to understand what 
drives it. When the number of tradable firms is large (small), reductions in the 
demand for non-tradables can be accommodated through an expansion in the 
output of tradables with a relatively small (large) decline in the real wage, since 
the high (low) stock of capital per potential worker invested in tradable 
production implies that the marginal product of labor declines little (a lot) for 
every additional worker. In the limit, if there is no capital invested in the tradable 
sector, there will be no employment in the sector and the adjustment will take 
place exclusively through the expenditure switching implications of real exchange 
rate movements. This fact will become important below when we endogenize the 
number of firms.  
5.  Irreversible Capital and Financial Frictions 
The final ingredients of the model relate to the investment decision, which in this 
setup is equivalent to the number of firms in each sector. As was mentioned 
before, foreigners own the capital in both sectors. They have to decide the number 
of firms that will operate in each sector before the government expenditure is 
  24realized. Hence, if investors are risk neutral, the entry condition for the non-
tradable sector is:  
() [] ρ α
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α
α
≥

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
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
 −
− 1
1 q E  
and for the tradable sector is 
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α
≥
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
 −
− 1
1 q E  
where E is the expectation operator. Substituting the solutions for the RER we 
have that the stochastic profits in each of the sectors are: 
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Now, we introduce financial frictions in the model by appealing to risk aversion. 
However, the results presented in the paper would be the same if instead of risk 
aversion, we had assumed costly bankruptcy.  
  25Firms require a rate of return that must compensate them for the volatility of 
profits. The rate of return will be proportional to their degree of risk aversion σ. 
Assume that the entry condition is given by 
()
σ
π
σ
−
= Π
−
1
~ 1
i
i  
for each sector.  
Notice that the profits of the tradable sector inherit the stochastic properties of Ψ . 
Indeed, the variance is proportional to the variance of Ψ . Similarly for the non-
tradable sector. Implicitly the degree of risk aversion implies that the expected 
return has to be equal to the risk free rate plus σ   times the variance of the profits. 
When the number of tradable firms increases the value of Ψ  increases 
(diminishing the expected profit) but reducing its variance. Notice that this 
movement is always positive in the non-tradable sector. An increase in the 
number of tradable firms increases the expected value of Ψ , increasing the 
expected value of the profits, and reducing the volatility of Ψ , reducing further the 
risk premium.  
  266. Simulation 
In this section we simulate numerically the model in order to understand the 
implications of changes in the size of the oil revenues, its volatility and degree of 
risk aversion on the economy. In particular, we will study their effect on the 
number of firms in each sector, the utility of households and the volatility of the 
real exchange rate. The parameters chosen for the simulation are as follows. The 
economy has a size of L=1. We assume that the rate of return required is equal to 
5 percent. We set α equal to 0.25 and not the more common 0.3~0.4 because in 
this model, capital is composed of tradable goods. In real life, capital also has 
non-tradable components. However, assuming a demand for non-tradables for 
investment purposes would have complicated the model unnecessarily.  
We let the mean level of oil income move from 0.1 to 0.8. We assume that it is 
uniformly distributed with a coefficient of variation of zero, 0.25, 0.75 and 0.875. 
We present our results for two cases: a risk neutral case (σ=0, which we interpret 
as no-financial frictions) and an alternative case with a relatively large degree of  
risk aversion (σ=15).  
In each figure the x-axis indicates the mean level of the oil income. Each figure 
has four panels: the top panel is the number of non-tradable firms in equilibrium, 
the second one is the number of tradable firms, the third is the utility of 
  27consumption and the final panel is the volatility of the real exchange rate. In each 
panel we represent four curves representing the four degrees of volatility 
mentioned above, where the thicker lines represent greater volatilities.  
Lets study first the risk neutral case (Figure 5). As the mean level of oil income 
increases, the number of firms in the non-tradable sector rises and the number in 
the tradable sector declines. The economy monotonically tends to specialize away 
from tradables, as would be predicted from the standard Dutch Disease literature. 
Notice that utility is little affected by the level of oil income. Recall that we 
assume that the government spends the oil revenue in non-tradable goods that 
households do not value and that capital is foreign owned. Hence, the utility of 
households is determined by the real wage and this does not change with oil 
income.  
Volatility in this setup has surprising effects: it increases the number of firms in 
the tradable sector, lowers the number of firms in the non-tradable sector and 
increases utility! This contradicts the conventional wisdom, which suggests that 
the increase in uncertainty should be bad for investment, especially if it is 
irreversible. This intuition does not hold in this model, a feature amply discussed 
in the neoclassical literature  (See Hartman, 1972, Caballero, 1991, Caballero and 
Pindyck, 1996). The main reason for this effect is the fact that the profits of 
tradable firms are a convex function of Ψ . This means that greater volatility 
  28increases expected profits and investment in tradables. On the other hand, the 
profits in the non-tradable sector can be concave or convex in Ψ  and hence the 
volatility will have less salutary effects. For the parameters in this model the 
function is concave and the number of non-tradable firms falls with volatility
6. 
Utility increases because wages are also convex in Ψ . Interestingly, specialization 
in this model is not associated with volatility but instead solely with the average 
level of oil income. Hence, policies geared at stabilization are not welfare 
improving.  
We now turn to the case with risk aversion (Figure 6). We assume a level of risk 
aversion of 15, which is high by conventional standards but significantly less than 
the coefficient of 40 required to explain the equity premium in developed 
countries. Remember that we take risk aversion to be a proxi for financial 
frictions in the economy.  
Here we observe a similar initial impact of increases in the mean level of oil 
income on the number of firms in both sectors. However, notice that now 
volatility lowers the number of firms in both sectors, as investors demand a higher 
return to compensate for the greater variance in their returns, overwhelming the 
                                                 
6 In fact, for most reasonable set of parameters the schedule is concave. The relationship becomes 
convex when the number of non-tradable firms approaches zero.  
  29otherwise convex relationship of profits on Ψ .  There is a point at which the 
tradable sector completely shuts down. We refer to this phenomenon as inefficient 
specialization. At that point, the number of firms in the non-tradable sector also 
declines (and then rises very gradually), the volatility of the real exchange rate 
increases by a factor of more than 10 and utility collapses.  
The mechanism that brings this about is a vicious circle between specialization 
and volatility. Remember that the volatility of the real exchange rate and Ψ  is 
inversely proportional to the number of firms in tradables. As the number declines 
profits become more volatile, but risk aversion requires now a higher risk 
premium, which lowers investment in tradables further and further increases 
volatility. The sector disappears because the cost of capital makes expected firm 
profits negative. This happens only in the tradable sector because its price is 
exogenously set. In the non-tradable sector, the increase in risk premia lowers 
investment, but this increases the price of non-tradables, preserving profitability.  
The decline in utility is related to the magnitude of the inefficiency of the 
specialization. A measure of this inefficiency is the difference between the 
number of tradable firms in the zero volatility curve and the actual number of 
firms. Notice that as the average level of oil income increases, the economy 
would naturally specialize and hence the gap between the efficient number of 
firms and the actual number declines. Hence, utility recovers, but does not reach 
  30the no volatility level because the absence of the tradable sector makes the real 
exchange rate more volatile and hence lowers the investment in non-tradables, 
where the number of forms also falls relative to the optimal level.  
This result might help explain why countries that were very specialized in oil 
production such as Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Venezuela fared so poorly when oil 
income declined while countries such as Indonesia, Mexico and Norway were 
much less affected. The first group was specialized in oil and when oil income 
declined that specialization became much more inefficient, while the lack of a 
tradable sector created a level of volatility and risk premia that did not allow for 
investment. Diversified countries could adjust with much smaller costs.  
In conclusion, (i) specialization in the production of non-tradables creates an 
economy with more volatile relative prices. (ii) financial frictions interact with 
this volatility further specializing the economy as the stock of capital will respond 
to the greater macroeconomic volatility. (iii) this specialization may lead to the 
complete and inefficient disappearance of tradable production. (iv) this 
specialization reduces the investment in non-tradables - which will face a larger 
cost of capital - and lowers welfare.   
  31Clearly, in this context, a higher level of oil revenues can become a curse if it 
leads the economy to inefficiently specialize. Moreover, stabilization policies can 
have large welfare implications.  
III. Policy  implications 
The curse of natural resources has so far been explained as being caused by either 
rent-seeking or diversification away from sectors enjoying increasing returns. 
Separately, expenditure stabilization policies have been advocated based on the 
welfare benefits of consumption smoothing. In this paper we have proposed an 
alternative mechanism for the curse that integrates it with the discussion of 
stabilization.  
We point out that an economy that is diversified, in terms of having a significant 
non-oil tradable sector, will be much less affected by volatility in government 
domestic spending than an economy that is already fully specialized in non-
tradables. This is so because in a diversified economy shocks to non-tradable 
demand can be accommodated through changes in the structure of production 
while specialized economies have to rely on expenditure switching. We note that 
countries with more resource rents will naturally produce fewer tradables and 
hence are more likely to be naturally specialized.  
  32However, the presence of quite standard financial frictions, such as costly 
bankruptcy, will make relative price volatility affect the cost of capital through 
risk premia. This has three major consequences: first, it causes the economy to 
specialize further by making it harder and in some cases impossible for the 
tradable sector to access capital; second, it causes higher interest rate and less 
capital in the non-tradable sector under specialization; third, it greatly increases 
the welfare losses caused by volatility.   
The policy implications of this model are relatively straightforward. They have to 
do with avoiding inefficient specialization, and reducing the costs of volatility. 
We separate our discussion in two parts. First we deal with first-best policies, 
which are based on reducing the distortions in the economy. Then we move to 
second-best policies, where we assume that the distortions are hard to remove and 
look at interventions that can improve welfare, given that the distortions make the 
market outcome inefficient.  This is in general the spirit of the policies we are 
discussing below. 
A. Fiscal  policy 
  To discuss fiscal policy it is important to separate between three types of 
countries:  
  33•  Those that are naturally specialized, i.e. those that would specialize even 
in the absence of volatility.  
•  Those that are inefficiently specialized 
•  Those that are not specialized and would like to stay that way 
1.  Naturally Specialized Countries 
These countries have so much natural resource wealth that it does not make sense 
for them to engage in the production of other tradables, even in a first-best world. 
Some Gulf states might be in this category. However, in these countries, 
specialization makes relative prices very sensitive to the volatility in government 
spending. These countries would benefit from policies that stabilize government 
expenditures in order not to transmit volatility to the domestic market.  
2. Inefficiently  Specialized  Countries 
These countries are suffering from major welfare losses associated with the 
inability to develop the tradable sector, which makes the cost of capital high, even 
for non-tradable sector. Countries such as Venezuela and Nigeria may be in this 
category. Inefficient specialization is the product of a combination of factors: the 
level of government spending, the volatility of that spending, the “commercial-
risk-free” interest rate to which firms in the economy have access and the 
magnitude of financial inefficiencies.  
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sufficiently to get it over the specialization frontier. Incremental changes may not 
be enough to improve matters significantly. There are three fiscal margins in 
which these economies could work: the average level of government spending, its 
volatility and the “commercial-risk-free” interest rate.  
With respect to the first point, it is useful to be precise in what we call 
“government spending” in the context of our model. We assumed that there was 
no domestic taxation. In a world with taxes, the relevant policy variable is the 
primary deficit excluding oil revenues and external spending by the government. 
This variable must be credibly lowered and stabilized in order to cross the 
specialization frontier. There is some trade-off between lowering the average and 
lowering its volatility. The more credible the reduction in volatility, the less 
important will be the required reduction in average spending. However, our 
simulations suggest that, for the parameters we studied, feasible cuts in average 
spending seem quantitatively more effective than feasible reductions in volatility, 
although the latter bring greater improvements in welfare. Hence, an ideal policy 
would rely on both. Hence, stabilization per se would not be enough: cuts in the 
structural non-oil primary deficit would be called for.  
Furthermore, fiscal policy and debt management policies have an important role 
to play in affecting the interest rate. In our model we assumed a riskless 
  35international interest rate to which we added the commercial risks faced by each 
sector. In real life, on top of this commercial risk there may be country risk, 
associated with fears about the sustainability of public debt and of the 
government’s fiscal position. Factors that increase country risk will have the 
effect of moving the specialization frontier in: the economy will specialize at 
lower average levels of spending and at lower volatilities.  
Country risk often rises because of concerns about willingness to pay, or because 
the budget institutions are perceived as not capable of imposing an effective 
budget constraint. Also, poor debt management can inefficiently expose a country 
to roll over risks or other problems and thus increase country risk. These problems 
should be avoided by any country. However, resource rich countries are at risk of 
suffering heavily because the higher interest rate these problems cause may 
inefficiently keep them specialized in a low income – high volatility environment. 
It is important to stress that countries in this category become specialized, not 
because wages in dollars are too high. In fact, if they are able to move to the 
world of diversification, capital intensity will rise and workers wages will 
increase. Moving to a diversified economy is welfare enhancing; it does not imply 
real wage cuts.  
  363. Diversified  Economies 
Economies in this category are characterized by having large non-resource 
tradable sectors. Examples in this category are countries such as Ecuador, Mexico 
or Indonesia. In these countries, volatility in oil revenues will have smaller effects 
on relative prices, provided that they have relatively flexible domestic markets
7. 
Hence, the benefits of stabilization ceteris paribus are likely to be smaller than in 
the other two cases. However, these economies run the risk of becoming 
specialized if they increase the average non-oil primary deficit, its volatility or 
have high country risk. For example, Indonesia has seen a big increase in country 
risk, while Ecuador is undergoing a big expansion in oil production in the context 
of very high country risk. Here the role of fiscal policy is to keep the economy 
diversified. It is mainly a preventive strategy that is called for.   
B.  First-Best Financial Policies 
In our framework, the inefficient disappearance of the non-oil tradable sector is a 
consequence of financial frictions. Policies that minimize these frictions will 
allow the financial market to better manage the risks faced by the tradable sector 
and hence to displace the specialization frontier and to offer financing at lower 
                                                 
7 After all, in our model we assumed sufficient labor mobility to clear the labor market. 
  37cost, when the sector exists. We shall start with a list of first best policies. Later, 
we will discuss some more interventionist policies. 
Policies that complete financial markets by expanding the space for credible 
contracts will have particularly powerful effects on countries that are inefficiently 
specialized. These include: 
•  Policies that make contract enforcement less costly, through effective 
judicial enforcement and extra-judicial conflict resolution 
•  Policies that contain willingness-to-pay problems in financial markets 
such as facilitating the use and effectiveness of collateral 
•  Policies that efficiently reduce the cost of bankruptcy  
In addition, the high volatility that characterizes resource rich economies are 
bound to make equity particularly valuable, as it allows better risk sharing 
between firms and investors. This agenda calls for: 
•  Policies that facilitate direct investment, especially in the non-resource 
sector 
•  Policies to improve corporate governance so as to make equity claims 
more credible 
  38C.  Second Best Policies 
While first-best policies are good for all countries, they are particularly important 
valuable for inefficiently specialized economies. However, this inefficiency might 
also be addresses through second best policies, i.e. policies that assume that it is 
hard to credibly avoid fiscal spending volatility or financial frictions. What 
policies could improve welfare in such a context?  
The central problem with the inefficiency we describe is that the tradable sector is 
starved out of capital because it faces too high a real exchange rate volatility for 
debt markets to manage. Second best policies involve in one way or the other the 
need to stabilize the profits of the tradable sector. We discuss two main forms of 
intervention: trade policies and financial policies.  
1. Trade  policies 
If the tradable sector disappears because of unstable expected profits, what role 
could trade policy play? Let us consider state-contingent protection composed of 
export subsidies and import tariffs that would go up in times of real appreciation 
and would be lowered in periods of real depreciation. The idea is that with a more 
stable expected profit, the sector could attract more capital. In “good times” when 
oil is high and the real exchange rate is appreciated, export subsidies and import 
tariffs would kick in and keep profits from collapsing. In “bad times” when the 
  39real exchange rate weakens this extra support could be taken away. The policy is 
not unrelated to the “price bands” that protects sensitive agricultural products in 
many countries.  
This logic has a strong partial equilibrium flavor. Does it survive the general 
equilibrium logic? After all, the changes in relative prices in this model are 
equilibrium movements. In the logic of our model, these are the required prices 
needed to clear both the market for non-tradables and the labor market. Interfering 
with these relative price changes would likely cause even larger changes in 
underlying prices in order to achieve the requisite reallocation.  
However, the policy may survive the general equilibrium counter-forces provided 
it can assure investors that ex post returns will be sufficiently stable. The 
existence of more capital in the tradable sector does not prevent the sector from 
shedding labor in “good times” while it is there to absorb it in “bad times”. So, 
labor can still move between sectors, and since it will be working with more 
capital, will therefore be more productive. Moreover, if the tradable sector is 
substantial, its ability to absorb and shed labor will lower the volatility of the 
economy, reduce interest rates and support even more capital in the economy.  
Furthermore, while in our model movements in relative prices are caused by 
fundamental forces, in real life they may reflect other shocks and distortions 
  40which are less stabilizing. Protecting the tradable sector form their consequences 
may also be welfare enhancing.  
Thus, we find some rationale for state-contingent protection. Obviously, one 
important drawback is that political economy forces may prevent the government 
from lowering tariffs and export subsidies when the real exchange rate is weak or 
may lead to excessive protectionism.  However, it is not obvious that trade policy 
is the most efficient instrument.  Further analysis is surely called for.    
2.  Financial Support for Tradables 
Trade policy operates by changing the relative prices for goods faced by the 
whole economy. An alternative approach would be to offer some form of 
financial assistance to the tradable sector, without getting involved directly in the 
price setting process in the goods market. A financial intervention that increases 
the stock of capital in the tradable sector can help push the economy out of 
specialization. One instrument to consider is some form of financial guarantee. 
This guarantee can be made contingent not on the idiosyncratic risks of a project 
but instead on the real exchange rate, so as to limit moral hazard. Through this 
mechanism, the probability of having to incur in a costly bankruptcies would be 
reduced calling for lower interest rates. If this helps increase the size of the 
tradable sector, overall volatility might be reduced.  However, at least in the 
  41transition to a more diversified economy, these guarantees might be exercised 
with significant frequency, so the potential fiscal liabilities must be considered. 
However, it is important to remember that, at least in the typical case, the real 
exchange rate appreciates in good times, when oil revenues are high and the 
government spends too much. Having this financial guarantee in place might 
constitute a mechanism that “punishes the government” for overspending booms 
and thus might have the right incentive properties from a political economy 
perspective: it gives the tradable sector a contingent claim on future oil booms 
that might otherwise lead to their demise.  
Having said this, it is important to remember that in practice, money is fungible 
and that the tradable sector is not precisely defined in real life. Moreover, any 
initiative involving public monies will be subject to political economy distortions.  
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